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Adopting the Therapeutic Orphan? A Legal and Regulatory




Food and Drug Law




The central purpose of the prescription drug provisions of the Food Drug &
Cosmetic Act1 (FDCA) is to ensure the public health by verifying the safety
and ecacy of all pharmaceuticals that come to market.2 The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) achieves this purpose primarily by requiring extensive
premarket testing of all prescription drugs for safety and ecacy. Yet one dis-
tinct demographic group has not shared in the protections intended by the
FDCA: children.3 Drugs prescribed for children are overwhelmingly untested in
pediatric populations, and their safety and ecacy are generally inferred only
by extrapolating from adult clinical trials through pharmacokinetic or pharma-
codynamic analyses. As a result, pediatricians across the country are put in the
dicult quandary of having either to prescribe a potentially imprecise thera-
peutic regime for their patients or to withhold potentially benecial treatment.4
In order to address this problem, FDA issued a nal rule in 1998 that authorizes
it to mandate pediatric testing of all new drugs for their claimed indications and
of any marketed drug or biological product that is \used in a substantial num-
ber of pediatric patients, or that provides a meaningful therapeutic benet over
1Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codied
as amended at 21 U.S.C. xx 301 et seq. (1996)).
2See, e.g., United States v. An Article of Drug, Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 789 (1969).
3The authors of the FDCA clearly intended to include children within the statute's pro-
tections. As one of its main sponsors succinctly stated: \[T]he purpose of [the FDCA] is to
protect the public, to protect the mothers and the children...." 81 Cong. Rec. 7312 (1937
(statement of Rep. Coee).
4See Committee on Drugs, American Academy of Pediatrics, Guidelines for the ethical
conduct of studies to evaluate drugs in pediatric populations, 95 Pediatrics 286 (1995) (de-
scribing this decision as an ethical dilemma no less dicult than the decision whether to test
on pediatric subjects).
2existing treatments for pediatric patients"5 (\the Pediatric Testing rule," \the
1998 rule"). This rule empowers FDA to require a manufacturer to conduct
clinical tests on children to ensure (1) the safety and ecacy in children of all
new drugs; and (2) the safety and ecacy of prevalent o-label pediatric uses of
existing drugs, regardless of whether the manufacturer intended to market the
drug for pediatric use.
The Pediatric Testing rule|particularly as it applies to already-marketed drugs|
is dramatic in two ways. First, it represents a substantial step toward including
pediatric patients under the aegis of the FDCA's substantive protections. At the
same time, however, the rule also represents an enormous expansion of FDA's
regulatory authority and self-understanding. Until the rule, FDA's role was
limited to ensuring the safety and ecacy of all drugs based on the use intended
by the manufacturer. Manufacturers retained control over the indications and
populations for which the drug would be labeled and marketed. By contrast,
this new regulation allows FDA to mandate testing of already-marketed drugs
for use in populations wholly unintended|even disclaimed|by the manufac-
turer.
This paper explores the legality and the proper limits of the FDA's rule. Part I
lays out the background for the rest of the paper by exploring the complicated
policy and ethical problems posed by inadequate pediatric research. Part II
describes the history of FDA's response to the problem of inadequate pediatric
information, culminating in the 1998 rule. Part III describes the 1998 rule's
521 C.F.R. x201.23(a) (1999).
3potentially dramatic expansion of FDA's power over the regulated pharmaceu-
tical industry and analyzes whether this expansion falls within the agency's
statutory authority under the FDCA. Part IV explores the legislative history
behind the recently passed Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act
of 19976 (FDAMA) and suggests that Congress, when confronted with the 1998
Pediatric Testing rule, intended to relegate it to a policy of last resort. As a
result, congressional passage of the FDAMA should limit the rule's application
to the fairly narrow set of circumstances, described in Part V, in which market
incentives are inadequate to induce sucient pediatric testing. Ultimately, al-
though the Pediatric Testing rule is a valid exercise of administrative authority,
the legislative backdrop for the rule should caution FDA against imposing the
mandate except as a means of correcting \market failure."
I. Adopting the Therapeutic Orphan|The Need for Pediatric
Testing
A. The Consequences of Inadequate Pediatric Research
Despite the substantive protections of the FDCA, an overwhelming propor-
tion of the drugs prescribed by physicians to children have never been tested
in pediatric patients or approved by FDA for their use. Clinical trial data sub-
mitted to FDA as part of a New Drug Application (NDA) typically does not
6Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296
(1997).
4include data from pediatric testing but is rather limited to clinical tests on adult
subjects. Phase I and II clinical trials generally are limited to adult (usually
male) subjects between ages 20 and 40; Phase III trials often include a wider
range of age groups, including the elderly, but children|particularly infants|
are usually not included.7
As a result of these clinical testing standards, most drugs approved by FDA are
labeled with disclaimers against pediatric use. According to the 1991 edition of
the Physician's Desk Reference (PDR), 81% of all prescription drugs contained
language disclaiming use in children;8 an even greater number disclaimed use
in infants, for whom almost no information is currently available.9 A survey
of new molecular entities (NMEs) by FDA from 1984 to 1989 similarly found
that 80% were approved without labeling for pediatric use.10 In 1992, only two
out of nineteen drugs (11%) approved by FDA were labeled for pediatric use;11
in 1995, only four out of twenty-ve (16%) were so labeled.12 Many of these
drugs have signicant therapeutic use for pediatric populations. For example,
pediatric use of most of the drugs commonly used to treat pain in children|e.g.,
morphine, meperidine, fentanyl, midazolam, bupivacaine, and ketorolac|is ex-
plicitly disclaimed by the manufacturer.13 Some drugs|such as the asthma
7See Charles J. Cote, Ralph E.. Kauman, Gloria J. Troendle & George H. Lambert, Is the
\therapeutic orphan" about to be adopted? Use of nonpediatric-approved drugs on children,
98 Pediatrics 118 (1996).
8See J. T. Gilman & P. Gal, Pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic data collection in
children and neonates, 23 Clinical Pharmacokinetics 1 - 3 (1992); see also 143 Cong. Rec.
E1093 (daily ed. June 3, 1997) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
9See Pediatric Testing Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,632, 66,632 (1998).
10See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration,
Offices of Drug Evaluation Statistical Report (1989).
11See Committee on Drugs, American Academy of Pediatrics, Guidelines for the ethical
conduct of studies to evaluate drugs in pediatric populations, 95 Pediatrics 286 (1995).
12See 142 Cong. Rec. S11,992 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996, statement of Sen. Kassebaum).
13See Charles J. Cote, Ralph E.. Kauman, Gloria J. Troendle & George H. Lambert, Is the
5drug Albuterol|are used primarily in children but yet are not approved for
pediatric use.14 Finally, the issue of inadequate pediatric research has been
brought to the fore by the epidemic of pediatric AIDS. Although medical ad-
vances such as protease inhibitors and new cocktail drugs have raised the hope
that AIDS victims will live longer, healthier lives, none of these drugs has been
approved for use in newborns or infants, despite the fact that the rst days of
life may provide the best opportunity for reversing the eects of HIV.15
To be sure, some of these drugs are indirectly tested through the use of studies
that extrapolate from adult tests in order to infer the safety and ecacy of
drugs on children. But, especially for infants, these tests are frequently inaccu-
rate because \[g]rowth, dierentiation, and maturation can alter the kinetics,
end organ responses, and toxicities of drugs in newborn, infant, child, or adoles-
cent as compared to adult.... Drug studies in adult humans may not adequately
predict the pharmacokinetic, pharmacodynamic, or toxic properties of drugs,
in children."16 Extrapolation from adult studies is at best an inexact science,
since it provides no real guarantee that the distinctive physiology of children
will not cause adverse reactions to the drug in children.
\therapeutic orphan" about to be adopted? Use of nonpediatric-approved drugs on children,
98 Pediatrics 118, 119 (1996)..
14Although asthma is the single most common reason for admissions to the hospital of
children under ve, no asthma drug on the market is actually approved for use in patients
under ve. See 143 Cong. Rec. S4277 (daily ed. May 9, 1997, statement of Sen. Dodd).
15See 143 Cong. Rec. S4277 (daily ed. May 9, 1997, statement of Sen. Dodd). The absence
of AIDS drugs approved for pediatric use has created a dilemma for many HIV-infected
parents. As one commentator to the FDA's Pediatric Testing Rule noted, \the absence of
drugs for [HIV] infection that are appropriately labeled and formulated for pediatric patients
causes parents to give children inappopriate doses, sometimes giving up part of their own dose
if the child's physician will not prescribe it." Pediatric Testing Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,632,
66,637 (1998).
16Committee on Drugs, American Academy of Pediatrics, Guidelines for the ethical conduct
of studies to evaluate drugs in pediatric populations, 95 Pediatrics 286 (1995).
6The result of this systematically inadequate pediatric labeling is that o-label
prescribing by physicians has \by default become an established standard of
care of children."17 Pediatricians must, through a combination of guesswork
and extrapolation from information gleaned from studies of adults, estimate the
proper therapeutic regimen for their pediatric patients. While such o-label
prescriptions are explicitly lawful,18 they create signicant risks to the health
of pediatric populations. These dangers are not just theoretical but real: Drugs
that have been administered to children without sucient pediatric testing have
resulted in severe toxic eects, including fatalities.19 Perhaps the most widely-
recognized example is the death of a number of newborn infants in the 1950s as
a result of \gray-baby" syndrome induced by chloramphenicol, which was never
tested for safety and ecacy in neonates.20 More recent examples include toxi-
cities experienced in the pediatric use of common drugs such as bupivacaine,21
17See 143 Cong. Rec. S11,992 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996, statement of Sen. Kassebaum)
(quoting the American Academy of Pediatrics).
18Indeed, the FDAMA explicitly amended the FDCA to prohibit the FDA from interfering
in the practice of medicine by physicians. See Pub. L. No. 105-115, x 214, 111 Stat. 2296,
2348 (codied at 21 U.S.C. x 396 (1997 Supp.)).
19See, e.g., W. A. Silverman, D. H. Anderson, W. A. Blanc & D. N. Crozier, A dier-
ence in mortality rate and incidence of kernicterus among premature infants allotted to two
prophylactic regimens, 18 Pediatrics 614 (1956).
20See L. E. Bums, J. E. Hodgman & A. B. Cass, Fatal circulatory collapse in premature
infants receiving cloramphenicol, 261 New Eng. J. Med. 1318 - 1321 (1959); H. M. Feder,
Jr., C. Osier & E. G. Maderazo, Chloramphenicol: a review of its use in clinical practice, 3
Rev. Infectious Disease 479 - 91 (1981); D. A. Powell & M. C. Nahata, Chloramphenicol:
New Perspectives on an Old Drug, 16 Drug Intelligences & Clinical Pharmacy 295 - 300
(1982).
21See R. Agarwal, et. al., Seizures Occurring in Pediatric Patients Receiving Continuous
Infusion of Bupivacaine, 75 Anesthesia & Analgesia 1305 - 06 (1993); J. J. McCloskey,
et. al., Bupivacaine Toxicity Secondary to Continuous Caudal Epidural Infusion in Pediatric
Patients, 75 Anesthesia & Analgesia 287 - 90 (1992).
7vecuronium,22 midazolam,23 and fentanyl.24 These fatalities and adverse reac-
tions could be eliminated by ensuring that drugs used in children are properly
tested in pediatric populations.
B. The Ethical Dilemma of Pediatric Testing
While inadequate information clearly poses risks to pediatric patients, pedi-
atric testing poses risks of its own. As a result, it is perhaps on an ethical rather
than a legal level that FDA's rule is most controversial. As part of its argument
that the Pediatric Testing rule is authorized by the FDCA, FDA argues that
the rule is authorized by x 505(i), which allows FDA to make exceptions to its
normal regulations for the purpose of allowing investigations of new drugs, and
by x 505(k), which requires FDA to have \due regard... for the interests of
patients" subject to those investigational drugs. Together, FDA argues, these
provisions allow it to \impose conditions on the investigation of new drugs, in-
cluding conditions related to the ethics of a proposed investigation and to the
22See D. M. Fisher et. al., Neuromuscular Eects of Vecuronium (ORG NC45) in Infants
and Pediatric Patients During N 2O Halothane Anesthesia, 58 Anesthesiology 519 - 23
(1983).
23See A. Hiller, et. al., Unconsciousness Associated with Midazolam and Erythromycin,
65 Brit. J. Anaesthesia 826 - 28 (1994); K. T. Olkkola, et. al., A Potentially Hazardous
Interaction Between Erythromycin and Midazolam, 53 Clinical Pharmacy Therapy 298 -
305 (1993).
24See I. S. Gauntlett, Pharmacokinetics of Fentanyl in Neonatal Humans and Lambs: Ef-
fects of Age, 69 Anesthesiology 683 - 87 (1988); R. E. Kauman, Fentanyl, Fads, and Folly:
Who Will Adopt the Therapeutic Orphans?, 119 J. Pediatrics 588 - 89 (1991); G. Koren
et. al., Unexpected Alterations in Fentanyl Pharmacokinetics in Pediatric Patients Undergo-
ing Cardiac Surgery: Age Related or Disease Related?, 9 Developmental Pharmacology
Therapeutics 183 - 91 (1986).
8interests of patients."25 In the context of pediatric drugs, \[b]ecause exclusion
of pediatric patients from clinical trials may deny them an equitable share of the
benets of research, [these provisions] authorize FDA to require their inclusion
in clinical trials."26 In short, FDA argues that the ethical treatment of children
requires the Pediatric Testing rule.
Notwithstanding FDA's claim to be defending the best interests of pediatric
patients, there is considerable disagreement as to whether it is inclusion or ex-
clusion that is ethically problematic. On one side, it is clear that the exclusion
of pediatric patients from clinical trials denies the group as a whole the bene-
ts of scientic research. Pediatricians and children's advocates, agreeing with
FDA, have been vocal in condemning this exclusion as unethical. For exam-
ple, the American Academy of Pediatrics has consistently called for pediatric
testing, citing \a moral imperative to formally study drugs in children so that
they can enjoy equal access to existing as well as new therapeutic agents."27
Indeed, some children's advocates have gone so far as to suggest|albeit quite
implausibly|that the exclusion of children from clinical testing rises to the level
of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.28 In sum, advocates of pediatric
25Proposed Pediatric Testing Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,900, 43,908 (1997).
26Id.
27Committee on Drugs, American Academy of Pediatrics, Guidelines for the ethical conduct
of studies to evaluate drugs in pediatric populations, 95 Pediatrics 286 (1995).
28See Althea Gregory, Denying Protection to those Most in Need: The FDA's Unconsti-
tutional Treatment of Children, 8 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 121, 134 - 147 (1997). The
argument is implausible because the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the proposition
that age is a suspect classication under the Equal Protection Clause. For its most recent
rearmation, see Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, U.S. , 2000 WL 14165 (Jan. 11,
2000) (rearming that \age is not a suspect classication under the Equal Protection Clause"
and striking down the ADEA, as applied to state government employers, as an invalid exercise
of congressional power under x 5 of the 14th Amendment). Although the Court's holdings
have occurred in the context of old age, the Court's rationales|that age is relevant to state
interests and therefore does not create an inference of prejudice or antipathy|apply equally
to discrimination against children and infants. Cf. infra note 38.
9testing argue that the exclusion of pediatric patients is distributively unfair to
children as a group because it denies them the benets of more thorough clinical
research.29
There are powerful arguments on the other side, however, mainly grounded in
the rights-based notion that it is never justied to put an individual at risk,
even in order to advance medical knowledge.30 This problem arises with full
force in the context of controlled clinical trials|widely used to establish the
ecacy of a drug in pediatric populations|which must generally be controlled
by administering placebos to a control group. Especially when the pediatric
patient suers from a serious condition, being placed in a control group poses
risks to that patient's health in order to advance the good of the pediatric pop-
ulation as a whole. Although proponents of pediatric testing, including FDA,
have attempted to develop ethical guidelines for clinical testing in order to re-
duce the risks to the individual pediatric patient, no guidelines have completely
eliminated the fact the individual patient's welfare may be subordinated to the
welfare of pediatric patients as a whole.31 As the current Department of Health
In addition, any equal protection claim would fail given that FDA has not intentionally dis-
criminated against pediatric patients. Rather, such discrimination is merely the eect of
a general policy of only reviewing data and representations produced by the manufacturer.
Because disparate impact is not sucient to establish an equal protection violation, see Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), any claim against FDA's previous pediatric testing policy
would fail.
29See Proposed Pediatric Testing Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,900, 43,908 (1997) (\Fairness in
distribution of the burdens and benets of research is one of the ethical principles underly-
ing federal regulations on investigational drugs."); Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and
Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,194
(1979) (same).
30For the most well-known argument to this eect, see Paul Ramsey, The Patient as
Person (1970).
31See Pediatric Testing Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,632, 66,655 (1998) (\\[A]lternatives to
placebo-controlled trials should be used wherever they can provide sucient information to
establish eectiveness."); see also 21 C.F.R. x 314.126 (1999) (allowing data from active con-
trol stuidies for certain therapeutic classes such as anti-infectives and oncologic drugs); see
also Committee on Drugs, American Academy of Pediatrics, Guidelines for the ethical conduct
10and Human Services guidelines prescribe, placebo-controlled studies may be con-
ducted, even to the potential detriment to the subject, if \[t]he intervention or
procedure is likely to yield generalizable knowledge about the subjects' disorder
or condition which is of vital importance for the understanding or amelioration
of the subjects' disorder or condition."32
Pediatric testing also raises a complex problem regarding the relationship be-
tween parental authority and the child's individual autonomy. Traditionally,
young children (as contrasted to adolescents, who have been granted some inde-
pendence from their parents33) are considered, because of their limited compe-
tence to consent, to be exclusive wards of their parents, who have the authority
and duty to make decisions on their behalf.34 Thus for those children who,
in the judgment of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) overseeing the study,
are not mature enough to give their assent to clinical testing, FDA requires
permission of the child's parent or guardian.35 The substitution of parental
of studies to evaluate drugs in pediatric populations, 95 Pediatrics 286 (1995) (prescribing
limits on the ethical use of placebo control groups); see also National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research Involv-
ing Children, Report and Recommendations: Research Involving Children (1977); K.
Lebacqz, The National Commission and research in pharmacology: an overview, 36 Fed.
Proc. 2344 - 48 (1977) (recommending special protections for vulnerable and noncompre-
hending subjects).
32Additional Protections for Children Involved as Subjects in Research, 48 Fed. Reg. 9814,
9819 (1983) (codied in 45 C.F.R. x 46.406 (1999)).
33The ethical problems involving adolescents and young adults are quite dierent from
those involving children who are clearly unable to give meaningful consent. Obviously, the
line between the two groups is somewhat hazy. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (A minor can give eective consent if she is \suciently mature
to understand the procedure and to make an intelligent assessment of her circumstances with
the advice of a physician."). But when a child is considered suciently mature to consent,
the legal quandary usually arises when the child's legal will diers from that of her parents.
See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
34The most famous cases arise in the context of parents' constitutional right to control their
children's education. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of the
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
35See Additional Protections for Children Involved as Subjects in Research, 48 Fed. Reg.
9814, 9819 (1983) (codied in 45 C.F.R. x 46.408 (1999)).
11consent raises the obvious specter of conicts between the best interests of the
child and potential ulterior interests of the parent. For example, in cases where
compensation is given for participation in the study, parents may be induced to
assent to their child's participation without full reection on the study's risks
and benets. In addition, research has shown that \parents who volunteer their
children for medical research are signicantly more socially disadvantaged and
emotionally vulnerable" than those who do not.36 Poor and minority children
are also overrepresented in research protocols.37 Thus, the inclusion of children
itself raises serious questions of distributive fairness and equity.38
Nevertheless, as a majority of experts in the eld of medical ethics agree,39 the
benets of pediatric testing outweigh the risks to pediatric subjects for three
basic reasons. First, the risks posed by controlled clinical tests, which can
be minimized through the use of appropriate ethical and medical standards,
pale in comparison to the risks posed by unregulated o-label experimentation
by physicians. Second, even if the risks of nonvalidated drug treatment are
the same in controlled and uncontrolled settings, clinical trials are preferable
36See S. C. Harth & Y. H. Thong, Sociodemographic and Motivational Characteristics of
Parents Who Volunteer Their Children for Clinical Research: A Controlled Study 300 Brit.
J. Med. 1372 - 76 (1990) (nding that only 15 percent of mothers and 16 percent of fathers
who volunteered their children had a university education while 26 percent of mothers and 45
percent of fathers who did not volunteer their children had a university education).
37See, e.g., A. S. Tannenbaum & R. A. Cooke, Research Involving Children app. 1 -
10 (1997).
38Arguably, this inequality is more constitutionally serious than the inequality created by
inadequate pediatric testing because minority children|who are a constitutionally suspect
class|are disproportionately disadvantaged by the current clinical testing regime. Cf. supra
note 28.
39See, e.g., National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomed-
ical and Behavioral Research Involving Children, Report and Recommendations:
Research Involving Children (1977); Committee on Drugs, American Academy of Pedi-
atrics, Guidelines for the ethical conduct of studies to evaluate drugs in pediatric populations,
95 Pediatrics 286 (1995).
12because they allow researchers to accumulate new information that may aid fu-
ture patients. Finally, the risks posed to individual pediatric subjects are less
ethically problematic than the risks posed by inadequate pediatric information:
Whereas participants in any clinical study must give informed consent, either
directly or through their parents, children who receive nonvalidated prescription
drugs are totally defenseless against the risks posed by untested drugs. Thus,
although there are countervailing arguments, it is not \arbitrary and capricious"
for FDA to conclude that pediatric testing is ethically justied.
II. The Origins of FDA's Pediatric Testing Rule
Startled by the inadequacy of pediatric information in prescription drug
labeling, FDA promulgated a series of rules over the course of half a decade de-
signed to rectify the paucity of pediatric testing of prescription drugs. Through
these regulations, which culminated in the 1998 Pediatric Testing Rule, FDA
gradually expanded its authority to allow it to mandate pediatric testing by
pharmaceutical companies.
FDA's initial response in 1992 was to propose a rule amending the agency's
\pediatric use" labeling requirements.40 As nalized in 1994,41 the rule rep-
resented a two-pronged eort to foster greater information about the pediatric
uses of prescription drugs. First, it relaxed the clinical test requirements for
40See Proposed Pediatric Use Labeling Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,423 (1992) (amending the pre-
vious requirements, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434 (1979) (codied at 21 C.F.R. 201.57(f)(9) (1999))).
41See Pediatric Use Labeling Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,240, 64,241 (1994).
13pediatric labeling by allowing manufacturers to label drugs for pediatric use
based \on adequate and well-controlled studies in adults together with other
information supporting pediatric use (e.g., pharmacokinetic data, safety data,
pharmacodynamic data)" instead of based on actual clinical tests on children.42
Since extrapolation from adult studies is substantially cheaper and less time-
consuming than full-blown pediatric clinical trials, the regulation was designed
to reduce the cost to manufacturers of obtaining pediatric information.
In addition, the regulation increased the cost of not performing pediatric anal-
yses by imposing a disclaimer or warning requirement on drugs for which pe-
diatric information is inadequate. According to the regulation, if there is not
\substantial evidence to support any pediatric use or use in a particular pe-
diatric population," the \Pediatric use" section of the label must contain a
disclaimer stating that \Safety and eectiveness in pediatric patients have not
been established."43 If there is a specic hazard associated with the product,
the rule imposes a warning requirement in the \Contraindications" section of
the label.44
Although the rule was designed to create greater incentives for manufacturers
to test and label drugs for pediatric use, the 1994 rule did not immediately
solve the problem of inadequate pediatric testing. Three years after the rule
was nalized, FDA conducted a study that compared the number of NMEs that
were approved in 1991 and 1996 and found that the number of NMEs that pro-




1438% (fteen out of forty).45 In addition, it found that manufacturers' voluntary
promises to conduct pediatric tests had not \substantially increased the num-
ber of products entering the marketplace with adequate pediatric testing."46
Rather, these promises went unkept, largely because FDA lacked any power to
enforce them. In short, FDA concluded that the voluntary regime instituted by
the 1994 rule had not succeeded.
As a result, in 1997, FDA issued a rule allowing it to mandate pediatric testing.
The rule is two-pronged. First, the rule establishes a presumption that all new
drugs and biological products will be studied in pediatric patients, but allows
manufacturers to obtain a waiver if they can show that the product will provide
no meaningful therapeutic advance for pediatric patients.47 The rule also allows
companies to request deferral of pediatric testing for not-yet-approved products
until safety and eectiveness have been demonstrated in adult populations.48
Consistent with the 1994 rule, extrapolation from adult studies rather than clin-
ical trials on pediatric subjects may, at FDA's discretion, be deemed to satisfy
the testing requirement.49 Moreover, the rule does not require a manufacturer
of a new drug or biological product to study its product for unapproved or o-
label indications, even if the product is widely used in pediatric patients for
45See Proposed Pediatric Testing Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,900, 43,902 (1997); Pediatric
Testing Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,632, 66,638 tbl. 1 (1998).
46Proposed Pediatric Testing Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,900, 43,902 (1997); see Pediatric
Testing Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,632, 66,638 tbl. 1 (1998) (showing that between 1991 and 1996
only 11 out of 64 promises to conduct postapproval pediatric tests actually led to the addition
of pediatric labeling).
47See Pediatric Testing Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,632, 66,634 (1998) (codied at 21 C.F.R.
314.55 (1999)).
48See id. at 66,634 - 35.
49See id.
15those indications.50 Second, in terms of already marketed products, the rule
allows FDA to require pediatric testing of any marketed drug or biologic that is
\used in a substantial number of pediatric patients, or that provides a meaning-
ful therapeutic benet over existing treatments for pediatric patients."51 FDA
may require pediatric testing of these drugs even if the manufacturer did not
intend to market them for pediatric use.52
Thus, over the course of the decade, FDA initiated a voluntary testing and label-
ing program and followed it up with a mandatory testing program. In analyzing
this historical progression, it is important to understand how the 1994 volun-
tary testing rule legitimized the 1998 rule. First, the 1994 rule validated the
1998 rule by allowing FDA to argue that the voluntary testing requirement|
which had been in place for only a few years|had failed to achieve its intended
goal.53 By experimenting with an incentive scheme, but arguably never giving
it a real chance to work, FDA articially enhanced its justication for the test-
ing requirement. Second, the 1994 rule explicitly paved the legal way for the
1998 rule. In its 1994 rule, FDA included dictum stating that it had the legal
authority to require pediatric testing, even though it was creating only a volun-
tary scheme.54 The 1998 rule explicitly cited this dictum in support of FDA's
authority to promulgate the testing requirement.55 Thus, the most important
aspect of the 1994 rule was not its ecacy in inducing increased pediatric test-
50See id.
5121 C.F.R. x201.23(a) (1999).
52See Pediatric Testing Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,632, 66,634 (1998).
53See Pediatric Testing Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 66,632 (\The response to the 1994 rule has
not substantially addressed the lack of adequate pediatric use information for marketed drugs
and biological products.").
54See Pediatric Use Labeling Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. at 64,242 - 43.
55See Pediatric Testing Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 66,657.
16ing but rather its signicance as the foundation for FDA's later assertion of
statutory authority to mandate pediatric studies.
III. A Legal and Regulatory Analysis of FDA's Pediatric Testing
Rule
The 1998 Pediatric Testing rule was a dramatic step in FDA's eorts to
enhance children's health. Not surprisingly, commentators have questioned
whether the agency's expansion of power is authorized by law. This Part pro-
vides an analysis of the legality of FDA's rule, as well as of its relationship to
the FDAMA. I conclude that FDA's Pediatric Testing Rule is indeed authorized
by the broad language of the FDCA and is not \arbitrary and capricious" in
violation of the APA. However, although the Pediatric Testing rule represents a
potentially dramatic expansion of FDA's power over industry, Congress's enact-
ment of the FDAMA means that FDA should not invoke the testing requirement
except in cases where the incentives created by Congress have demonstrably
failed.
A. FDA and Industry|A Radical Transformation
17The 1998 rule undoubtedly represents a dramatic expansion of FDA's reg-
ulatory authority. Until the Pediatric Testing Rule, FDA's primary regulatory
responsibility was to ensure that drugs were safe and ecacious for the indi-
cations for which they were intentionally marketed. Under this regime, manu-
facturers controlled both the marketing of their product and the testing of the
drug; consequently, they could avoid costly testing by declining to market the
product for a particular indication or subpopulation.56 The role of FDA was
simply to assess the proposed marketing in light of data provided by the manu-
facturer and submitted to FDA. As FDA stated in 1967, \it is the manufacturer
who chooses the indications to be investigated and determines the dosage level
for which he will seek FDA approval. It is the duty of the Food and Drug
Administration under the law to decide that proposed usages and levels are
both safe and eective, based on the data submitted by the manufacturer."57
By requiring manufacturers to conduct and submit pediatric testing|even if
the manufacturer would prefer to disclaim pediatric use of the product|FDA
dramatically increased its authority over drug manufacturers.
The obvious question is whether this expansion of power is authorized by the
FDCA. Even some FDA ocials have expressed concern in the past that such a
provision is unauthorized. As then-FDA Commissioner David Kessler remarked
in a 1992 speech: \Despite the ardent desire of FDA to increase pediatric indi-
cations, I need to acknowledge the limits of FDA's authority. It is our job to
56See S. Rep. No. 361, 74th Cong., at (1937) (\The manufacturer of the article through
his representations in connection with its sale, can determine the use to which the article is
to be put.").
57See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Comment on Proposed Pe-
diatric Testing Rule, No. 97N-0165, Nov. 13, 1997.
18review drug applications for the indications suggested by the manufacturer. We
do not have authority to require manufacturers to seek approval for indications
which they have not studied.... Thus, as a matter of law, if an application con-
tains indications only for adults, we're stuck."58 Through the 1998 rule, FDA
attempted to unstick itself; but did it do so legally?
Before delving into the particular statutory claims made by FDA, it is impor-
tant to review the general interpretive framework that the courts have adopted
in construing FDA authority under the FDCA. As a matter of administrative
law, the 1998 rule may be challenged either as a statutorily unauthorized exer-
cise of agency power (Chevron59) or as an \arbitrary and capricious"60 exercise
of administrative discretion (Overton Park61). Because FDA serves such an
important public function|namely protecting human health and safety|its
power|especially under x 701(a) of the FDCA|has been broadly construed.62
To borrow a constitutional analogy, x 701(a) has been interpreted as analogous
to a \necessary and proper clause," whereby \the validity of a regulation pro-
mulgated [under the Act] will be sustained so long as it is `reasonably related
to the purposes of [the Act]."'63 Thus, as long as the regulation is designed to
satisfy a congressional objective that is expressed somewhere in the FDCA, the
regulation will be upheld.64 As the following analysis demonstrates, only one of
58Commissioner David Kessler, Speech, cited in Pharmaceutical Research and Manufac-
turers of America, Comment on Proposed Pediatric Testing Rule, No. 97N-0165, Nov. 13,
1997.
59Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
605 U.S.C. x 706(2)(A) (1994).
61Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
62See United States v. An Article of Drug, Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784 (1969).
63United States v. Nova Scotia Foods Prods., 568 F.2d 240, 246 (2d. Cir. 1977) (quoting
Mourning v. Family Publications Svcs., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973)).
64See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Ass'n. v. Food and Drug Administration, 484 F.
19its claims to statutory authorization fails this lenient test.
1. \False and Misleading in Any Particular"
In support of its rule, FDA rst argues that drugs and biological products
that do not contain adequate pediatric labeling based on FDA-approved pedi-
atric studies are misbranded under xx 502(a) and 502(f) of the FDCA. A drug is
misbranded under x 502(a) if its labeling is \false or misleading in any particu-
lar."65 Although \false" and \misleading" conjure images of armatively false
labeling, the FDCA's denition of the term is broad, including not only arma-
tive falsehoods but also material omissions. As x 201(n) states, a product' label
is misleading if \fails to reveal facts material... with respect to consequences
which may result" either from the use of the product suggested by the label or
from \the use of the [product] under such conditions of use as are customary or
usual."66 FDA's regulations interpret this to allow FDA to require adequate di-
rections for every use \for which the drug is commonly used."67 Because \there
is extensive evidence that drugs for diseases that aect both adults and pediatric
patients are routinely used in pediatric patients despite the absence of pediatric
labeling, and even in the face of disclaimers stating that safety and eectiveness
have not been established in children,... FDA may therefore consider pediatric
Supp. 1179, 1183 (D. Del. 1980).
6521 U.S.C. x352(a) (1994).
6621 U.S.C. x321(n) (1994).
6721 C.F.R. x201.5 (1999).
20use to be `customary or usual' or `commonly used."'68
Several objections might be made to FDA's claims. First, some of the legisla-
tive history of x 201(n) suggests that it was not designed to operate as broadly
as FDA alleges. In particular, the House Committee Report on the 1938 Act
appears to suggest that the provision was designed to require a disclaimer qual-
ifying claims to curative eects that are not unequivocally supported by the
scientic evidence. As the Report states, the provision is designed to satisfy
consumers' \right to know, when it is a fact, that the representations of cu-
rative value have only a narrow and limited support, and if the label fails to
reveal that fact, which is a material fact in light of the representations made,
then the labeling may be regarded as misleading. However, the misleading
character of the label may be corrected by an appropriate qualifying statement
revealing this material fact."69 If this accurately stated the legislative intent
of x 201(n), pediatric labeling would not be authorized, since it is not designed
to qualify an armative curative claim for pediatric patients; indeed, the rule
allows FDA to require pediatric testing even for drugs for which pediatric use
has been expressly disclaimed. But the House Report does not conclusively
demonstrate that x 201(n) precludes FDA from requiring more than qualifying
disclaimers for \narrowly" supported curative claims. Although the Report's
analysis might exhaustively describe FDA's authority to require facts that are
material in light of the \representations" made on the labeling, it does not speak
at all to FDA's textually granted authority to require facts that are material in
68Pediatric Testing Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 43,907.
69H. R. Rep. No. 2139, 75th Cong. (1938), reprinted in Charles Wesley Dunn, Federal
Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act 822 (1938).
21light of the product's \customary and usual use."70 This clearly demonstrates
that the committee's description of x 201(n)'s aims was illustrative rather than
exhaustive and that FDA's statutory authority transcends the single application
suggested by the Report.71
A second objection to the 1998 rule is that FDA's judgment that drugs without
pediatric labeling are misbranded is \arbitrary and capricious" given that it
has historically approved such drugs. Because estoppel does not lie against the
government,72 this argument is essentially a claim that, as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation, FDA's long-standing practice of declining to consider drugs
without pediatric labeling misbranded constitutes extrinsic evidence that those
products are not misbranded according to the statutory denition. While this
argument may be clever, it essentially constitutes a claim that past agency prac-
tice is binding through canons of statutory interpretation. Although a few old
administrative law cases came close to accepting this rationale,73 it conicts
quite severely with the modern understanding that agencies can alter their poli-
cies and interpretations as long as they provide sucient explanation to the
parties.74 Thus, the agency's past approval of these drugs does not preclude
it from deeming them misbranded in light of a new policy judgment about the
importance of pediatric testing.
Finally, challengers to the FDA rule might dispute FDA's conclusion that par-
7021 U.S.C. x321(n) (1994).
71See also Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Ass'n. v. Food and Drug Administration, 484 F.
Supp. 1179, 1184 (D. Del. 1980).
72See Oce of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990).
73See Packard Motor Car v. National Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
74See Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 884 F.2d 34 (1st Cir.
1989) (Breyer, C.J.).
22ticular drugs are \customar[il]y or usual[ly]" used in pediatric patients. Courts
interpreting x 201(n) have, however, given FDA wide latitude to dene uses that
are customary or usual. In National Nutritional Foods Association v. Novitch,75
for example, the district court refused to grant an injunction against FDA's re-
quirement that certain protein products with fewer than 400 calories per day
contain a label warning of the risk of serious injury or death. In ruling for
the government, the court stated that even if the product were not marketed
for weight reduction, the \agency was entitled to nd reasonably that weight
reduction was a `customary or usual use' of the product by reason of the fact
that it was `used for such purposes with some frequency."'76 The courts' broad
interpretation appears to validate FDA's regulation, which denes \customary
or usual" uses as those that are \common."77 In sum, FDA's 1998 Pediatric
Testing rule is authorized under xx 502(a) and 201(n) of the FDCA.
2. \Adequate Directions for Use"
FDA also claims that it can require pediatric testing because products with-
out pediatric labeling do not have \adequate directions for use" and are therefore
misbranded.78 In subsequent regulations, FDA has interpreted \adequate direc-
tions for use" to mean \directions under which the layman can use a drug safely
75589 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
76Id. at 801.
7721 C.F.R. 201.5 (1999).
7821 U.S.C. x352(f) (1994).
23and for the purposes for which it is intended."79 In this context, FDA denes
\intent" as the \objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the label-
ing of drugs."80 Objective intent may be shown by \labeling claims, advertising
matter, or oral or written statements by [the manufacturer]."81 In addition,
however, \if a manufacturer knows, or has knowledge of facts that would give
him notice, that a drug introduced into interstate commerce by him is to be
used for conditions, purposes, or uses other than the ones for which he oers it,
he is required to provide adequate labeling for such a drug which accords with
such other uses to which the article is to be put."82 In other words, purpose and
knowledge (actual or constructive) on the part of the manufacturer satisfy the
requirement of intentionality as interpreted by FDA. Pursuant to these regula-
tions, FDA claims that manufacturers who market drugs that are widely used
in pediatric patients have either actual or constructive knowledge of these uses.
As a result, the products are misbranded because they do not contain directions
for pediatric use.83
FDA's interpretation of \intent" might be compared to the statutory denition
of the term in the context of the denition of drugs and medical devices. Ac-
cording to the FDCA, drugs and medical devices are dened as products that
are \intended to aect the structure or any function of the body."84 Courts
interpreting these provisions have deeply divided over the question whether in-
7921 C.F.R. x201.5 (1999).
8021 C.F.R. x201.128 (1999).
81Id.
82Id.
83See Proposed Pediatric Testing Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,900, 43,907 (1997).
8421 U.S.C. xx 321(g)(1)(C), 321(h)(3) (1994).
24tentionality for the purposes of dening a drug or medical device can be proven
absent claims by the manufacturer about the product's use. Several courts have
acknowledged that intent can be inferred from evidence extrinsic to the man-
ufacturer's representations. For example, the Second Circuit has stated that
\the intended use of a product may be determined from its label, accompany-
ing label, promotional material, advertising, and any other relevant source."85
Other courts have concurred, albeit in dictum.86 By contrast, other courts have
rejected the suggestion that intent can be inferred from evidence extrinsic to the
label. Most prominently, a panel of the Fourth Circuit in Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Food and Drug Administration87 insisted that tobacco prod-
ucts were not drugs within the meaning of the statute because \no court has
ever found that a product is `intended for use' or `intended to aect' within the
meaning of the [FDCA] absent manufacturer claims as to that product's use."88
Given the deep division between the courts, and the salience of the political
issue of FDA's authority to regulate tobacco, this issue may well be resolved
when the Supreme Court reviews Brown & Williamson this Term.
Even if the Supreme Court agrees with the Fourth Circuit and rejects extrinsic
evidence of intent, FDA's interpretation of intent in the context of x 502(f) is
85United States v. Article of 216 Cartoned Bottles, \Sudden Change," 409 F.2d 734, 739
(2d. Cir. 1969) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Ten Cartons Ener-B Vitamin B-
12, 72 F.3d 285, 287 (2d. Cir. 1995) (\An article can be a drug under 21 U.S.C. x 321(g)(1)(C)
for reasons other than claims made in the label or labeling, such as `method of intake."').
86See, e.g., United States v. 250 Jars U.S. Fancy Pure Honey, 218 F. Supp. 208, 211 (E.D.
Mich. 1963) (To determine intended use, \a court is not limited to the labels on such articles
or to the labeling which accompanies it, but may look at all relevant sources.").
87153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted 119 S. Ct. 1495 (1999) (reversing Coyne
Beahm, Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Administration, 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C.
1997)).
88Brown & Williamson, 153 F.3d at 163 (quoting CoyneBeahm, 966 F. Supp. at 1390).
25likely to survive. Indeed, although there is a canon in statutory interpretation
that the same word will be given the same meaning throughout the statute,
this canon should yield to the principle of deference to agencies' interpretation
of their own regulations. As the Supreme Court has stated, an agency's in-
terpretation of its own regulations is controlling unless an \alternative reading
is compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the
Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation."89 Clearly, the
division among the courts on the issue suggests that there is no \plain mean-
ing" of the term \intent." There is also no evidence that the agency, at the
time of promulgating 21 C.F.R. x 201.5, intended to limit term \intent" to the
manufacturer's express purpose as evidenced by the label. Thus, the agency's
interpretation of intent as purpose or knowledge (actual or constructive) should
withstand judicial scrutiny even if the Supreme Court rejects a similar interpre-
tation of the FDCA's provisions dening drugs and medical devices.
Deference to the agency's interpretation is further warranted by two additional
facts. First, courts should not interfere with agency interpretations of its own
regulations where the regulation concerns \a complex and highly technical reg-
ulatory program" such as FDA's regulation of drug labeling.90 Drug labeling
requires a delicate balance between public safety and industry responsibility,
and the agency's ability to strike the proper balance without second-guessing
on the part of the courts is quite essential to the successful accomplishment of
89Gardenbring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988); see also Thomas Jeerson Univ. v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 513 (1994) (\[Courts] must give substantial deference to an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations.");
90Thomas Jeerson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512 (1994) (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines,
501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991).
26this balance. Second, deference is even more appropriate where, as here, the
agency's interpretation has declined to exercise its full statutory authority. In-
deed, because x 502(f) does not expressly require that the \adequate directions
for use" requirement be limited to intended uses, FDA could, as a strictly le-
gal matter, have required adequate directions for any use of the product|even
one that the manufacturer had no reason to know would occur. Thus, while
FDA's interpretation of its own regulations may ultimately not conform to the
courts' interpretation of the FDCA, its interpretation deserves greater defer-
ence as a voluntary limitation on agency power rather than an unauthorized
aggrandizement.
3. \Suggested" Use is Dangerous or Not Recognized as Safe
FDA also claims authority to require pediatric testing on the grounds that
(1) pediatric use is a \new drug" that is not generally recognized \as safe and
eective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested
in the labeling thereof"91 and (2) that the drug is misbranded because it is
\dangerous to health" when used in a manner \prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in the labeling."92
Several issues arise in conjunction with FDA's claims. First, one might ask
whether FDA is authorized to deem a drug \new" on the basis of a new use
9121 U.S.C. x321(p) (1994).
9221 U.S.C. x352(j) (1994).
27rather than a new chemical entity.93 Courts, however, have upheld FDA's au-
thority in this regard, holding that FDA can consider a drug \new" if it is
marketed for a new use or if it involves a new method of utilization.94 Sec-
ond, on might ask whether FDA can deem a drug \dangerous to health" in
the absence of evidence of actual toxicity. Although some drugs have resulted
in toxicities in pediatric patients, the vast majority of them simply have not
been tested for children. However, the statute clearly states that a drug may
be deemed misbranded if it is \dangerous to health when used in the dosage or
manner, or with the frequency or duration prescribed, recommended, or sug-
gested in the labeling thereof."95 Clearly, a drug labeled for adults would be
dangerous if prescribed in the dosages recommended for adults.
Thus, the dispositive question is not whether pediatric uses are new or whether
they are dangerous to health; rather, the ultimate question is whether the man-
ufacturer \prescribed, recommended, or suggested" pediatric use of the drug.
FDA argues that it is entitled to \consider pediatric use to be `suggested' in a
drug's labeling even where such use is not expressly recommended or is even
disclaimed."96 This argument is unpersuasive. Unlike the agency's authority
93See 21 C.F.R. x 310.3(h)(5) (1999) (The newness of a drug may arise from \the newness
of a dosage, or method or duration of administration or application, or other condition of use
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling of such drug, even though such drug
when used in other dosage, or other method or duration of administration or application, or
dierent condition, is not a new drug.").
94See United States v. Article of Drug Labeled Colchicine, 442 F. Supp. 1236, 1243
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citing 21 C.F.R. x 310.3(h)(5) as supporting FDA's contention that pheny-
toin in time-release capsule form is a new drug even though phenytoin in single dosage form
is generally recognized as safe and eective); Merrit Corp. v. Folsom, 165 F. Supp. 418, 421
(D.D.C. 1958) (\The newness of a drug... may arise by reason of, among others, a new or
dierent recommended use for the drug, or a new or dierent duration of administration, even
though the same drug may notbe a new drug when used in another disease or other duration
ofadministration").
9521 U.S.C. x 321(p) (1994).
96Pediatric Testing Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,632 66,658 (1999).
28under xx 502(a) and 201(n), which allows the agency to consider the \customary
or usual" use of the product, xx 201(p) and 502(j) explicitly limit the agency's
authority to the representations made by the drug manufacturer. Although
there is some ambiguity as to the precise scope of a \prescription, recommen-
dation, or suggestion," the plain language of the statute requires at least that
there be an armative statement of some kind. The interpretations of xx 201(p)
and 352(j) by the courts conrm this view. All of the courts that have armed
libel actions against misbranded drugs under x 502(j) have found that the drug
was misbranded because of an armative suggestion that the drug be used in
a certain way that is dangerous to health.97 Similarly, actions under x 201(p)
have been armed by the courts only where the drug's manufacturer made a
representation suggesting a use for a product that was not generally recognized
as safe.98 It appears clear, then, that the courts' interpretation of the statute
is not so broad as to allow FDA to regulate drugs whose safety and ecacy
are uncertain only under conditions about which the manufacturer makes no
representations or claims.99
97See, e.g., United States v. Torigian Laboratories, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1514, 1525 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (nding that the drug's labeling | which contained the term \intraocular lens" |
suggested that the lenses be used for surgery, and that the surgical use of non-sterile lenses
was a danger to the public health); United States v. Relaxacizor, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 943 (C.D.
Cal. 1970) (holding that electrical muscle stimulator was misbranded because failed to warn
of possible side-eects under expressly prescribed conditions of use); United States v. Lanpar
Co., 293 F. Supp. 147, 154 (N.D. Tex. 1968) (holding that drug was misbranded because
dangerous to health when used to ght obesity in the manner prescribed by the accompanying
promotional material).
98See, e.g., Merrit Corp. v. Folsom, 165 F. Supp. 418 (D.D.C. 1958) (; United States
v. Article of Drug Labeled \Quick-O-Ver," 274 F. Supp. 443 (D. Md. 1967) (holding that
hangover potion was not recognized as safe for labeled use becauseof the potential side eects
of ingredient ephedrine).
99This provides little consolation to manufacturers challenging the FDA's 1998 rule, how-
ever, since FDA clearly does have authority to deem a drug misbranded based on the failure
to disclose facts material to the drug's \customary or usual" use under xx 502(a) and 201(n).
See supra.
29Moreover, even if the manufacturer could \suggest" a use through omission
rather than representation, the law clearly does not allow FDA to regulate man-
ufacturers that have expressly disclaimed pediatric use on the labeling or other
accompanying information. As courts have held, a manufacturer who warns
about the dangers of a prescribed use cannot be held liable for misbranding un-
der x 201(p).100 By corollary, manufacturers who have disclaimed a particular
use should not be liable for misbranding. Thus, FDA is unjustied in asserting
that manufacturers have \prescribed, recommended, or suggested" pediatric use
sucient to confer jurisdiction under xx 201(p) and 502(j).
B. FDA and Congress|Pediatric Testing Requirements as a
Solution to \Market Failure"
The 1998 rule is authorized under two of the three provisions discussed
above. In addition, however, the rule's validity also depends on its relationship
to Congress's simultaneous eorts to resolve the problem of pediatric testing. In-
deed, if the FDAMA's incentive provisions were clearly intended to supplant or
preempt the mandatory provisions proposed by FDA, then the rule's legitimacy
would be in grave doubt under the rst prong of Chevron.101 The legislative his-
100See Fellows v. USV Pharmaceutical Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297, 301 (D. Md. 1980) (hold-
ing manufacturer cannot be liable for misbranding if it provides warning about the risks of
prescribed use).
101See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
- 43 (1984) (\If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give eect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
Inquiry into congressional intent must be particularly searching where an agency is attempting
30tory of the FDAMA, however, does not support the contention that the FDAMA
clearly repudiated the mandatory testing approach taken in the 1998 rule. What
the legislative history does make clear, however, is that Congress intended the
FDAMA's incentive provisions to be the rst line of attack in attempting to
ensure more comprehensive pediatric information. Congress intended the 1998
rule to \complement" the incentive scheme as a policy of last resort. Thus, the
rule's application should be limited to those circumstances in which Congress's
incentive scheme has demonstrably failed.
FDA's rulemaking occurred in front of a complicated legislative backdrop. Like
FDA, Congress was deeply concerned about the problem of inadequate pediatric
testing. Yet the legislative solution they proposed remained deeply wedded to
the idea of incentive structures rather than regulatory mandates. Indeed, just
45 days before FDA proposed the Pediatric Testing Rule, the Senate Labor
and Human Resources Committee had referred the FDAMA, which contained
provisions creating market-based incentives for drug manufacturers to conduct
voluntary pediatric tests, to the full Senate.102 By the time FDA nalized its
rule in December 1998, the FDAMA's pediatric testing incentives had been in
place for over a year. The legislative history of the FDAMA's pediatric testing
provisions demonstrates how Congress intended to use market-based incentives
as the primary solution to inadequate pediatric testing.
to expand its authority, arguably beyond statutory limits. See ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554,
1567 n. 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (\When an agency's assertion of power into new arenas is
under attack... courts should perform a close and searching analysis of congressional intent,
remaining skeptical of the proposition that Congress did not speak to such a fundamental
issue.").
102See 143 Cong. Rec. D631 (daily ed. June 18, 1997).
31Although the FDAMA was not passed until 1997, the pediatric testing provi-
sions that it incorporated were proposed over ve years earlier. In 1992, the
same year that FDA proposed its 1994 rule, federal legislators led by Senator
Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-KS) proposed the Better Pharmaceuticals for
Children Act to create incentives to induce pediatric testing by manufacturers.
The bill, which was modeled after existing market incentive provisions in the
FDCA,103 proposed to extend \6 months' marketing exclusivity for drug prod-
ucts for which FDA-approved pediatric studies are conducted" in order to create
incentives for pediatric testing by manufacturers.104 Given that Senator Kasse-
baum introduced the bill only several weeks before the end of the legislative
session, it was by her own admission not a rm proposal but rather \a vehicle
for discussion in coming months."105
Senator Kassebaum vastly underestimated the amount of time her proposed
discussion would take. Over the course of the next four years, she tirelessly
reiterated her concerns about the paucity of pediatric testing. Yet each time,
the dialogue she began ended without passage of a resolution. She reintroduced
the bill in the next Congress in 1994,106 and her House colleague, Rep. Mike
Kreidler of Washington, introduced parallel legislation in the House of Repre-
sentatives.107 Both bills died in committee.
In 1996, she proposed the bill again, this time picking up the key support of
103See 28 U.S.C. x 355(j)(4)(D) (1994).
104138 Cong. Rec. S16,998 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992, statement of Sen. Kassebaum)
(introducing The Better Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, S. 3337, 102nd Cong. (1992)).
105Id. at S16,999.
106See 140 Cong. Rec. S4165 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994, statement of Sen. Kassebaum)
(introducing The Better Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, S. 2010, 103rd Cong. (1994)).
107See 140 Cong. Rec. E935 (daily ed. May 16, 1994, statement of Rep. Kreidler).
32Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), the ranking minority member on the Sen-
ate Labor and Human Resources Committee.108 In committee, the bill was
incorporated as part of The Food and Drug Administration Regulatory Reform
Act of 1995 (\the 1995 Reform Act"), which sought broad-based reforms of
the regulatory process at FDA.109 Although the 1995 Reform Act was referred
out of committee with broad bipartisan support,110 it faced opposition among
powerful senators, including Senator Kennedy. Senator Kennedy objected to
the provisions which created mandatory, but shortened, product review time
frames for approving some priority drugs on the grounds that they would \crip-
ple the FDA."111 In addition, he objected to the provisions which allowed for
third-party expert review of some drugs on the grounds that they would \turn
[FDA's regulatory] functions over to private industry."112 Although Kennedy
admitted that FDA could be more eective, he refused to allow his colleagues
to \destroy the safeguards protecting the American people" from unsafe food
and drugs.113 Ultimately, because of senators' inability to resolve their acrimo-
nious disagreements, no action was taken on the bill before the legislative session
ended, and supporters vowed to take the issue up again in the next session.114
In the next session, Senator Jeords, picking up the mantle for Senator Kasse-
baum, who had decided not to run for reelection, introduced the FDAMA,
108See 142 Cong. Rec. S11,992 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996, statement of Sen. Kassebaum)
(introducing The Better Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, S. 2178, 104th Cong. (1996)); see
also id. (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996, statement of Sen. Dodd).
109S. Res. 1477, 104th Cong. (1996).
110See 142 Cong. Rec. D288 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996).
111142 Cong. Rec. S3203 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996, statement of Sen. Kennedy).
112Id.
113Id. at S3204.
114See 142 Cong. Rec. S12,150 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996, statement of Sen. Kassebaum);
142 Cong. Rec. S12,053 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1996, statement of Sen. Hatch).
33which, like the 1995 Reform Act, included the provisions of original the Better
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act.115 This time, the legislation passed, partly
because of the changes that were made to the bill to satisfy Senator Kennedy,
and partly because of Senator Kennedy's desire to compromise in order to se-
cure reauthorization of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, which would
have expired in 1997. Thus, after a long legislative journey, the provisions of
the Better Pharmaceuticals for Children Act were nally passed in 1997 as x
505(A) of the amended FDCA.116
In the nal debate over the FDAMA, legislators who were aware of FDA's
Proposed Pediatric Testing rule struggled to reconcile it with Congress's seem-
ingly inconsistent approach. Members' attitudes toward the FDA rule diered
markedly. Some supporters of the FDAMA|especially Republicans|appear to
have supported incentives and not mandates. For example, in the Senate Labor
and Human Resources Committee's report on the FDAMA, which was issued
before FDA's proposed rule, the committee commended FDA for attempting to
solve the problem of inadequate pediatric testing \by using its authority to ap-
prove labeling based upon the known pharmacokinetics of the drug, as opposed
to requiring pediatric clinical trials for ecacy."117 Likewise, Representative
Bliley, the main House sponsor of the FDAMA, expressed concern about FDA's
implementation of the law's pediatric provisions, emphasizing that the purpose
of the provision was to induce clinical testing through market incentives rather
115See 143 Cong. Rec. S5342 (daily ed. Jun. 5, 1997, statement of Sen. Jeords)
(introducing The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, S. 830, 105th
Cong. (1997) (enacted)).
116Pub. L. No. 105-115, x 111, 111 Stat. 2305 (1997) (codied at 21 U.S.C. x 355(a) (1997)).
117S. Rep. 105-43, at 51-52 (1997) (emphasis added).
34than mandates.118
Even those members who supported FDA's eorts to require pediatric testing
portrayed the Proposed Pediatric Testing rule as a supplement to the FDAMA's
incentive provisions. For example, Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA) emphasized
in his speech supporting the FDAMA that its pediatric exclusivity provisions
\complement[ed] the FDA's recent regulations."119 Likewise, Senator Mike
Dewine (R-OH), speaking after FDA's rule was proposed, applauded FDA and
argued that the FDAMA's pediatric testing provisions were intended to \work
with FDA's regulation."120
In sum, when Congress passed the FDAMA in 1997, legislators were deeply di-
vided on its consistency with FDA's mandatory approach. Although some mem-
bers were quite reluctant to acknowledge the validity or wisdom of the FDA rule,
most legislators clearly did not intend the FDAMA to preempt FDA's manda-
tory testing rule. Rather, they intended the FDAMA's incentive provisions to
complement FDA's mandatory provisions.
IV. FDA Implementation of x 505(A) and the 1998 Rule|Using the
Stick as a Last Resort When the Carrot Fails
As FDA moves forward in implementing both its rule and the FDAMA pro-
118See Implementation of FDA Modernization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of
the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. (1997), 1998 WL 18089104.
119143 Cong. Rec. E10,534 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1997, statement of Rep. Waxman).
120143 Cong. Rec. S9823 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997, statement of Rep. Dewine).
35visions as complementary provisions, it should be mindful of the delicate balance
between the incentive- and mandate-based approaches. As of the time of this
paper, FDA has yet to issue proposed regulations to implement x 505(A)'s pro-
visions; it has only published an updated guidance that serves as an interim
interpretation (\Guidance document").121 FDA plans to promulgate an up-
dated Guidance detailing the interrelationship between the 1998 rule and the
pediatric exclusivity provisions of x 505(A) in the next few months.122 This nal
Part oers prescriptions for ensuring that these regulations truly complement
the mandatory testing requirement, as Congress intended.
As noted above, FDA should implement the 1998 Pediatric Testing rule as a
solution to market failure rather than as a generalized regulatory mandate. In
order to let the market incentive structure have a chance to work, FDA should
use its power under the 1998 rule only in cases when the market incentives have
demonstrably failed. Otherwise, if FDA preemptively imposes testing require-
ments before the market incentives have had an opportunity to work|as it
appears to have done in regard to its 1994 rule|it will unjustiably undermine
the market solution intended by Congress.
There are two conditions under which the market incentive provisions created
by the FDAMA will systematically underproduce pediatric information. Only
in these situations where the \carrot" is inadequate should FDA resort to the
121See Center for Drug Evaluation, Food and Drug Administration, Guidance for Industry:
Qualifying for Pediatric Exclusivity Under Section 505(A) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, Sept. 1999 [hereinafter Guidance for Industry].
122Telephone Interview with Terrie Crescenzi, Project Manager, Pediatric Implementation
Team, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration (Jan. 27,
2000).
36\stick" of mandatory testing. First, because the incentive provisions created
by x 505(A) of the FDAMA apply only to products that have exclusivity or
patent protection under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restora-
tion Act123 and the Orphan Drug Act,124 they will simply have no eect on
drugs that are not covered by these laws. This includes many biologics, antibi-
otics, and, obviously, o-patent products.125 Thus, if FDA nds that pediatric
information regarding these products is necessary to the pediatric population,
then it must do so through the mandatory provisions of the Pediatric Testing
rule. This presumably is not inconsistent with Congress's intent: By limiting
the coverage of x 505(A)'s incentive provisions, the Congress declined to pro-
vide a market-based solution for these types of products, presumably leaving
the eld open for regulation by the agency.
Second, the inevitable truth about market-based solutions is that the produc-
tion of some information will always be economically inecient under a given
incentive regime. Faced with the prospect of six-months' exclusivity extension,
manufacturers will only conduct tests on drugs for which the benet of the ex-
clusivity exceeds the cost of the testing. The result of this cost-benet analysis
may not always correspond to the drug's importance to pediatric populations.
In particular, there are two types of drugs for which the incentives created by
x 505(A) may be inadequate. One potential problem is drugs that \are greatly
needed to treat pediatric patients, but that have smaller markets."126 Because
123Pub. L. No. 98-417, 99 Stat. 1585 (1984).
124Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983).
125See Pediatric Testing Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,632, 66,633 (1997).
126Id.
37the market is small, the value of the additional market exclusivity may be small,
making the additional tests unattractive from a cost-benet standpoint. An-
other potential fear is that manufacturers will have an inadequate incentive to
conduct studies in neonates. As noted in Part I, above, information in neonates
is almost universally unavailable, largely because the market incentive is in-
sucient given that studies on neonates are often extremely expensive. Thus,
where the market incentives are insucient to induce manufacturers to conduct
studies (1) for small-market drugs or (2) in small populations such as neonates,
it is appropriate for FDA to resort to the mandatory framework set out in the
1998 rule.
In sum, the FDA rule and the FDAMA's provisions should be truly comple-
mentary. The FDAMA's six-month market exclusivity provision provides a sig-
nicant incentive for manufacturers voluntarily to submit pediatric studies for
FDA approval. Only when this market incentive is insucient|i.e., for drugs
that (1) are very important to a small number of pediatric patients but that
are not protable for marketing to pediatric populations or (2) are o-patent|
should FDA exercise its authority to require testing and force the manufacturer
to conduct FDA-approved studies to ensure safety and eectiveness for children.
IV. Conclusion|FDA in a New Regulatory Environment
FDA is unique in its regulatory power, both in terms of the breadth of
38its statutory powers and in the deference that it receives from courts in exer-
cising those powers. The case of pediatric testing is no dierent: Unsurpris-
ingly, FDA's vast expansion of power is authorized by the statute and would
be validated by any court in which it were to be challenged. But the 1998
Pediatric Testing rule is also situated within the new regulatory culture ush-
ered in by the Republican Congress. This culture is driven by incentives rather
than mandates, markets rather than regulation. It is evidenced not only in x
505(A) of the FDAMA but also in Congress's other deregulatory legislation.127
Within this new regulatory environment, the position of FDA's Pediatric Test-
ing rule is rather tenuous. As FDA implements its 1998 Pediatric rule, in light
of the FDAMA's pediatric exclusivity provisions, FDA should|both out of in-
stitutional self-protection and in deference to the sovereign will of legislature|
exercise its wide discretion carefully so as not to disrupt the market structure
intended by Congress.
127See, e.g.,Tryoyen A. Brennan & Donald M. Berwick, New Rules: Regulation,
Markets, and the Quality of American Health Care 12 - 13 (1996) (describing the
Republicans' return to a deregulatory regime based on market incentives, repudiating the
activist regulation of the 1980s).
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